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Plato on the foundations of Modern Theorem Provers 
 
Inês Hipolito1 
Nova University of Lisbon 
 
 
 
Abstract: Is it possible to achieve such a proof that is independent of both acts and 
dispositions of the human mind? Plato is one of the great contributors to the foundations of 
mathematics. He discussed, 2400 years ago, the importance of clear and precise definitions as 
fundamental entities in mathematics, independent of the human mind. In the seventh book of 
his masterpiece, The Republic, Plato states “arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, 
compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of 
visible or tangible objects into the argument” (525c). In the light of this thought, I will 
discuss the status of mathematical entities in the twentieth first century, an era when it is 
already possible to demonstrate theorems and construct formal axiomatic derivations of 
remarkable complexity with artificial intelligent agents  the modern theorem provers. 
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Introduction 
 
According to Platonism, a mathematical proof is the metaphysical view that there are 
abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of human language, thought, 
and practices. A full-blooded Platonism or platitudinous Platonism (FBP) asserts that it is 
possible for human beings to have systematically and non-accidentally true beliefs about a 
platonic mathematic realm  a mathematical realm satisfying Existence, Abstractness and 
Independence. Could there be such proof? Could a proof be objective and completely 
understood, independently of the possibilities of our knowing of truth or falsity? 
Plato is one of the great contributors to the foundations of mathematics. He discussed, 
2400 years ago, the importance of clear and precise definitions as fundamental entities in 
mathematics. In the seventh book of his masterpiece, The Republic, Plato states “arithmetic 
has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, 
and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument”. In the 
light of this thought, I will discuss the status of mathematical entities in the twentieth first 
century, an era where it is already possible to demonstrate theorems, construct formal 
axiomatic derivations of remarkable complexity with artificial intelligent agents  the 
modern theorem provers. A computer-assisted proof is written in a precise artificial language 
that admits only a fixed repertoire of stylized steps. It is formalized through artificial 
intelligent agents that mechanically verify, in a formal language, the correctness of the proof 
previously demonstrated by the human mind. 
In contrast, calculi are exactly the kind of feature, which make it appealing for 
mathematicians. There are two reasons for this: (i.) it can be studied for its own properties 
and elegance of pure mathematics; and (ii.) can easily be extended to include other 
fundamental aspects of reasoning. According to Hofstadter, (1979), a proof is something 
informal, that is, a product of human thought, written in human language for human 
consumption. All sorts of complex features of thought may be used in proofs, and, thought 
they may “feel right”, one may wonder if they can be logically defended. This is really what 
formalization is for.  
 
 
1. Plato’s conception of Arithmetic  
 
According to Plato, at the end of the sixth book of The Republic, mathematicians’ 
method of thinking is not a matter of intelligence, but rather a matter of	 	 which 
means understanding. This is a definition by Plato that seems to	 etimologically imply	 	
(between),	 	 (intelligence) and	 	 (opinion), as if	 understanding would be something in 
between opinion and inteligence. 
In 525a, Plato considers the concept of number, as a non-limited unity trough 
plurality, since “this characteristic occurs in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be 
both one and infinite in multitude” (525a). Also, with this conception of plurality as much as 
unity “thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at 
a decision asks ‘What is absolute unity?’ This is the way in which the study of the one has a 
power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of reality.” (525a). 
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As reported by Plato, the reality of calculus is a pure contemplation since in reasoning 
about numbers there are no visible bodies:  
 
“Plato  Now, suppose a person were to say to them, Glaucon, ‘O my friends, what are these 
wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there are constituent 
units, such as you demand, and each unit is equal to every other, invariable, and not divisible 
into parts,’ - what would they answer? 
Glaucon They would answer, as I should think, that they were speaking of those numbers 
which can only be realized in thought, and there is no other way of handling them.” (Republic, 
526a). 
 
This means that arithmetic compels the soul to reach the pure truth trough 
intelligence. Furthermore, Plato considered the idea of good to be the ultimate objective of 
philosophy: “in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only 
with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things 
beautiful and right” (526d). In his perspective, to accomplish the ideal of good, it is necessary 
that one study arithmetic and geometry, since they have two important characteristics. First, 
they invite thought and lead the mind to reflect and, accordingly, they allow the mind to 
grasp truth. Second, the advanced parts of mathematics and geometry have the power to draw 
the soul from becoming to beings: the true use of arithmetic. Therefore, the easiest way for 
the soul to go from becoming is to pursue the study of arithmetic until one is able to see the 
natures of numbers with the mind only. Moreover, “arithmetic has a very great and elevating 
effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number and repelling against the 
introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument” (525c).  
In agreement with Plato’s considerations, mathematics has a philosophical importance 
since mathematics is a tool that helps and exercises the mind to think. This training process 
will lead to a better understanding and to the accomplishment of the idea of good, which is 
the crucial purpose in Philosophy. Indeed, the main philosophical importance of mathematics 
is the rewarding it may have in one’s understanding of the reality. This is possible because 
mathematical objects are Forms: they can be completely separated from perceptible objects 
and they exhibit the same traits that philosophical objects. This means that mathematical 
objects are not grasped by the senses but by the intellect. In The Republic, on the one hand, 
mathematical objects are intelligible and can be known and, on the other, mathematical 
axioms are accepted as true without further proof or investigation. This view stands that 
unlike physical objects, mathematical objects do not exist in space and time; rather there are 
abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of the human mind: just as 
electrons and planets exist independently of us, so do numbers and sets. And just as 
statements about electrons and planets are made true or false by the objects with which they 
are concerned, so are statements about numbers and sets. Correspondingly, one may say that 
mathematical Platonism may be defined as a conjunction of three theses: Existence, 
Abstractness, and Independence. 
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3. Existence, Abstractness and Independence 
 
According to Dummett, 1978, Platonism, as a philosophy of mathematics, is founded 
on a simile: the comparison between the apprehension of mathematical truth to the 
perceptions of physical objects, and thus of mathematical reality to the physical universe. 
Gödel (1995), asserts that Platonism is the view that mathematics describes a non-sensual 
reality, which exists independently both of acts and [of] the dispositions of the human mind 
and is the only perceived, and probably perceived very incompletely, by the human mind.  
Maddy (1990), stresses that realism of Platonism is the view that mathematics is the 
scientific study of objectively existing mathematical entities just as physics is the study of 
physical entities. The statements of mathematics are true or false depending on the properties 
of those entities, independent of our ability, or lack thereof, to determine which. Parsons 
(1983), sustains that Platonism means here not just accepting abstract entities or universals 
but epistemological or metaphysical realism with respect to them. Thus, a platonistic 
interpretation of a theory of mathematical objects takes the truth or falsity of statements of 
the theory, in particular statements of existence, to be objectively determined independently 
of the possibilities of our knowing this truth or falsity. 
There are several theses within the mathematical Platonism such as (1) Frege’s 
arithmetic-object argument; (2) Quine’s; and (3) a response that is commonly referred as full-
blooded or platitudinous Platonism2 (FBP).  
The fundamental idea behind FBP is that it is possible for human beings to have 
systematically and non-accidentally true beliefs about platonic mathematical realm  a 
mathematical realm satisfying the Existence, Abstractness and Independence  without that 
realm in any way influencing us or us influencing it. These three thesis are made possible in 
virtue of (i.) Schematic Reference: the reference relation between mathematical theories and 
the mathematical realm is purely schematic, or at least close to purely schematic and (ii.) 
Plenitude: the mathematical realm is very large, it contains entities that are related to one 
another in all of the possible ways that entities can be related to one another. 
Moreover, Existence, Abstractness and Independence seem to be validated by two 
other thesis (i.) mathematical theories embed collections of constraints on what the 
ontological structure of a given “part” of the mathematical (ii.) The existence of any such 
appropriate part of the mathematical realm is sufficient to make the said theory true of that 
part of that realm. In agreement with Roger Penrose,  
 
Platonic existence, as I see it, refers to the existence of an objective external standard that 
is not dependent upon our individual opinions nor upon our particular culture. Such 'existence' 
could also refer to things other than mathematics, such as to morality or aesthetics, but I am here 
concerned just with mathematical objectivity, which seems to be a much clearer issue... 
Plato himself would have insisted that there are two other fundamental absolute ideals, 
namely that of the Beautiful and that of the Good. I am not at all adverse to admitting 
the existence of such ideals, and to allowing the Platonic world to be extended so as to contain 
absolutes of this nature (Penrose, 2007). 
 
																																																								
2 This third response has been most fully articulated by Mark Balaguer (1998) and Stewart Shapiro (1997). 
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The concept Existence in mathematical objects is rather controversial. If this view is 
true, it will dig up the physicalist idea that the reality is exhausted by the physical and will 
also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge3, since there is little doubt 
that the human mind possesses mathematical knowledge. Burgess has defended anti-
nominalism. Anti-nominalism is, simply, the rejection of nominalism. As such, anti-
nominalists endorse ontological commitment to mathematical entities, but refuse to engage in 
speculation about the metaphysical nature of mathematical entities that goes beyond what can 
be supported by common sense and science (Burgess 1983, and Burgess and Rosen 1997, 
2005). Anti-nominalism, is the conjunction of Existence and Abstractedness, and its 
consequences are not as strong as of Platonism. Some views such as intuitionistic, are anti-
nominalistic about being a Platonism, for the existence of mathematical objects are true 
however, these objects depend on or are constituted by mathematicians. 
On the Truth-value realism perspective4, Mathematical objects must exist since they 
are true of all. Mathematical objects have the existence in virtue of its unique and objective 
truth-value independent of whether we can know it and whether it follows logically from our 
current mathematical theories. Mathematical objects have a unique and objective truth-value. 
Expressly, “a sentence proper is a proper name, and its Bedeutung5, if it has one, is a truth-
value: the True or the False” (Beaney 1997, 297). This is clearly a metaphysical view, but not 
an ontological view, as Platonism, since truth-values are not committed to the flow from an 
ontology that demands Existence.  
For another hand, there is the working realism methodological view that entails 
mathematics should be practiced as if Platonism was true (Bernays, 1935, Shapiro, 1997), 
considering that working realism is first and foremost a view within mathematics itself about 
the correct methodology of the discipline, and Platonism, rather, is a philosophical view. 
Nevertheless, as reported by Hoystein (2013), this two are very related theories since, 
assuming Platonism is true, then (1) language of mathematics is a classical first-order 
language; (2) provided it is legitimate to reason classically about any independently existing 
part of reality, classical rather than intuitionistic logic; (3) since Platonism ensures that 
mathematics is discovered rather than invented, there would be no need for mathematicians 
to restrict themselves to constructive methods and axioms, which establishes non-
constructive methods; (4) impredicative definitions are legitimate whenever the objects being 
defined exist independently of our definitions, and this is how we assure the impredicative 
definitions; (5) if mathematics is about some independently existing reality, then every 
mathematical problem has a unique and determinate answer, which provides at least some 
motivation for Hilbertian optimism. As we can see, the truth of mathematical Platonism has 
important consequences within mathematics itself. 
On this matter, Frege developed an argument  the Fregean argument  which is 
based on two premises: (1) The singular terms of the language of mathematics purport to 
refer to mathematical objects, and its first-order quantifiers purport to range over such 
																																																								
3 In the nominalist perspective there exist no abstract or universal objects: this position denies the existence of 
abstract objects – objects that do not exist in space and time. 
4 The notion of a truth value has been explicitly introduced into logic and philosophy by Gottlob Frege—for the 
first time in 1891, and most notably in his seminal paper (1892). 
5 meaning 
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objects, this is, S to be true, must succeed in referring or quantifying, a classical semantics 
perspective; (2) most sentences accepted as mathematical theorems are true (regardless of 
their syntactic and semantic structure). By Classical Semantics and Truth, Frege considers 
that some simple numerical identities are objectively true because such identities allow the 
application of natural numbers in representing and reasoning about reality, especially the 
non-mathematical parts of reality. Other versions of Fregean argument are sometimes stated 
as the notion of ontological commitment, such as the Quine’s Criterion6. 
On the other hand, Abstractness asserts that a mathematical object is said to be 
abstract just in case it is non-spatiotemporal, and therefore causally inefficacious. In Plato’s 
thought, this distinction embodies the distinction between Forms, and Sensibles. In the 
seventeenth century, Locke’s idea of an abstract object  as one that is formed from 
concrete ideas  was rejected by Berkeley and then by Hume. However, even for Locke 
there was no suggestion that the distinction between abstract ideas and concrete corresponded 
to a distinction among objects. In the twentieth century, Frege insisted that the objectivity and 
aprioricity of the truths in mathematics entail that numbers are neither material beings nor 
ideas in the mind. In The Foundations of Arithmetic (1974), Frege concludes that numbers 
are neither external “concrete” things nor mental entities of any sort. Later in The Thought 
(1952) he asserts that thoughts belong to a “third realm”. Similar claims have been made by 
Bolzano, and later by Brentano, and his pupil Husserl. 
In most recent attempts to distinguish concrete objects from abstract, Putnam (1975) 
makes the case for abstract objects on scientific grounds. Bealer (1993) and Tennant (1997) 
present a priori argument for the necessary existence of abstract entities.  The dispute over 
the existence of abstracta is reviewed in Burges and Rosen (1997). A general theory of 
abstract objects is developed in Zalta (1983, 1999). 
Independence is less evident than the other two claims. What does it mean for an 
object to be independent? Does it mean it is self-representative? An object seems to be 
independent when what it represents does not depend on any intelligent agent, or an agent’s 
thought, reason, cognition or representation.  
So far one may say that we have understood how mathematical objects assure their 
Existence and their Abstractedness. However, are mathematical entities sufficiently true to 
claim independence?  Is it possible to entail mathematical objects as an objective concept? If 
Independence means that (1) mathematical objects are mind-independent; that (2) reality 
includes objects not subject to intentionality; that (3) to be referred requires a definition of 
truth; and that (4) there is only one correct description of the reality, then the trivial forms of 
Platonism are likely to satisfy the claim, and thus qualify Platonism with the property of 
Independence.  
On this account, there are at least some objects, in reality, that could be perceived by 
the human mind via definition. On this assumption, an object is said to be independent when 
it is self-representative. Furthermore, we may also think of some other examples of self-
representation. The Epimenides’ paradox “All Cretans are liers” therefore, “I am a liar”, ergo 
“This statement is false”. This paradox relies on some form of self-reference. Any language 
																																																								
6 A first-order sentence (or collection of such sentences) is ontologically committed to such objects as must be 
assumed to be in the range of the variables for the sentence (or collection of sentences) to be true. 
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capable of expressing some basic syntax can generate self-referential sentences. A language 
containing a truth predicate and this basic syntax will thus have a sentence L such that L 
implies ¬Tr(L) and vice versa. 
Also Gödel’s incompleteness theorems use mathematical reasoning in exploring 
mathematical reasoning itself. What the theorem states and how it is proved are, as a matter 
of fact, two different things. The theorem asserts that all consistent axiomatic formulation of 
number theory includes undecidable propositions. In the same way that Epimenides’ paradox 
is a self-referential, also Gödel’s axiom is a self-referential mathematics statement7 . In 
Gödel–numbering, numbers are made to stand for symbols and sequences of symbols. 
Transporting the Epimenides’ Paradox into number-theoretical formalism, the Epimenides’ 
Paradox does not say  
 
This statement of number-theory is false.  
but that  
This statement of number-theory does not have any proof.  
 
We could agree that proofs are demonstrations within fixed systems of propositions. 
However, this statement of number theory does not have any proof in the system. Gödel’s 
sentence is unprovable within the system, for there are true statements of number theory, 
which its methods of proof are too weak to demonstrate in the system; therefore, the system 
is incomplete. In fact, what Gödel showed was that provability is a weaker notion than truth 
no matter what axiomatic system is involved, and therefore, no fixed system could represent 
the complexity of the whole numbers8. Actually, if a system, such as the one defined in 
Principia Mathematica, is (i.) consistent, this is, contradiction free; and (ii.) complete, this is, 
every true statement of number theory could be derived within the framework drawn up in 
the P.M., how would it be possible to justify the methods of reason on the bases of that same 
methods of reasoning? If such a proof could be found using only methods inside a system 
then, the system itself would be inconsistent. 
As we discussed on the first part of this essay, Plato considered the knowledge of 
arithmetic a conditio for philosophical knowledge since both require universal truths, 
accessible to the human mind by acquaintance to the incorporeal intelligible realm,  in 
opposition of doxai, which belong to a sensible sphere,  in resolving the problem of reality, 
knowledge and human existence. 
Plato, in his considerations on arithmetic and geometry assesses epistemological 
issues, such as what and how the mind know things; and metaphysics, on their ontological 
status as things. As we discussed, a mathematical proof is a mathematical object that qualifies 
to the properties of Existence, Abstractedness and Independence. A proof is, a consequence 
of human reasoning, written in human language for human consumption. What is still left to 
																																																								
7 For more detail on this issue, see Hofstadter (1979). 
8 Cf. Nagel and Newman, (2001). 
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discuss is whether a computer assisted proof  a proof that results from an artificial 
intelligent agent  may or may not qualify to those properties.  
 
 
 
3. Modern Theorem Provers 
 
A computer assisted proof is a proof in which every logical inference has been 
checked all the way back to the fundamentals axioms of mathematics (Hales, 2008). It is 
written in a precise artificial language that admits only a fixed repertoire of stylized steps 
(Harrison, 2008).  
Proof assistants or computer theorem provers are the artificial intelligent agents that 
mechanically verify, in a formal language, the correctness of the proof previously 
demonstrated by the human mind. In fact, with this artificial system, the user is allowed to set 
up a mathematical theory, define properties and realize logical reasoning (Geuvers, 2009). 
Nowadays, there is a large number of computer provers, that can check or construct 
computer assisted proofs, such as the HOL Light for classical and higher order logic, based 
on a formulation of type theory; and Coq. The theorem provers allow the expression of 
mathematical assertions; mechanically checks proofs; helps to find computer assisted proofs; 
and extracts a certified program from the constructive proof of its formal specification. Other 
theorem provers are  Mizar, PVS, Otter/Ivy, Isabelle/Isar, Affa/Agda, ACL2, PhoX, IMPS, 
Metamath, Theorema, Lego, Nuprl, Ωmega, B method and Minlog. 
According to Wiedijk (2006), theorem provers: 
– are designed for the formalization of mathematics, or, if not designed 
specifically for that, have been seriously used for this purpose in the past; 
– are special at something. These are the systems that in at least one dimension 
are better than all the other systems in the collection. They are the leaders in 
the field.  
In recent years, several theorems have been formally verified by an artificial 
intelligent agent. There are many to choose from, however, some significant ones are: 
  (1) The Four Colour Theorem, states that, given any separation of a plane into 
contiguous regions, producing a figure called a map, no more than four colors are required to 
color the regions of the map so that no two adjacent regions have the same color. The 
theorem was proven in the late 19th century (Heawood 1890); however, proving that four 
colors suffice turned out to be pointedly harder. A number of false proofs and false 
counterexamples have appeared since the first statement of the four color theorem in 1852. 
Nevertheless, it was proven, using a computer, in 1976 by Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang 
Haken. It was the first major theorem to be proved using a computer. In 2005, Benjamin 
Werner and Georges Gonthier formalized a proof of the theorem inside the Coq proof 
assistant. 
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 (2) The Jordan Curve Theorem, states that every simple closed curve in the plane 
separates the complement into two connected nonempty sets: an interior region and an 
exterior. The Jordan curvetheorem is named after the mathematician Camille Jordan, who 
found its first proof9. In 1905, O. Veblen declared that this theorem is “justly regarded as a 
most important step in the direction of a perfectly rigorous mathematics”. According to 
Courant and Robbins, “The proof given by Jordan was neither short nor simple, and the 
surprise was even greater when it turned out that Jordan’s proof was invalid and that 
considerable effort was necessary to fill the gaps in his reasoning”. According to Hales 
(2007), Jordan’s proof is essentially correct... Jordan’s proof does not present the details in a 
satisfactory way. But the idea is right, and with some polishing the proof would be 
impeccable. In 1978, Dostal and Tindell in their essay “The Jorden Curve Theorem 
Revisited”, wrote “however, notwithstanding substantial simplifications achieved in the 
elementary proof of JCM by these and other authors, the theorem has remained and will 
probably always remain, difficult to establish by purely elementary means”. This proof was 
formalized, in 2005, using HOL Light.  
(3) The Odd Order Theorem precisely says that groups that have an odd number of 
elements are solvable. Finite groups can be factored somewhat like integers, though for a 
more complicated multiplication. The basic group factors, called simple groups, also come in 
many more shapes than the basic integer factors, the prime numbers. Solvable groups, 
however, can be factored down to primes, like integers. They’re called this because they 
correspond to solvable polynomial equations. Feit and Thompson classically demonstrated 
this proof in 1963. Recently, it was formalized, in 2012, using Coq System. 
 
Discussion 
 
The history of mathematical reasoning began with the attempt to mechanize the 
thought processes. Aristotle codified syllogisms and Euclid codified geometry. Frege and 
Peano worked on combining formal reasoning with the study of sets and numbers. David 
Hilbert worked on stricter formalizations of geometry than Euclid’s. All of these efforts were 
directed towards clarifying what one means by “proof”. 
In 1940, giant electronic brain catalysed the convergence of three previously disparate 
areas: theory of axiomatic reasoning, the study of mechanical computation and Psychology of 
intelligence. Since then, there has been a restless progress of in computer science and 
artificial agency. What does this has to do with Plato’s theory of arithmetic explained 
previously in this essay? Following his that perspective, a proof is a statement about the 
reality that satisfies the condition of Existence, Abstractness and Independence. Mathematical 
objects exist objectively; this means they (1) are not subject to spatiotemporal causality and 
are intentionality independent; and (2) that to be referred they demand a definition of truth, 
which is the one and only correct description of reality.  
Modern theorem provers seem to satisfy all of the above conditions in the 
accomplishment of a computer assisted proof. The great enterprise of Artificial Intelligence is 
to find out what sort of rules could possibly capture intelligent reasoning. If we assume a 
																																																								
9 For decades, mathematicians generally thought that first rigorous proof was carried out by Oswald Veblen. 
However, this notion has been challenged by Thomas C. Hales and others. 
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platonistic perspective, the machine seems to be much able to perform an arithmetic proof. 
The following table aims to be self-explanatory on that matter: 
 
 
Formal	System Classical	Mathematical	
Interactive	Theorem	Proving The	Human	Mind
Symbolic	language Natural	language
Computer	assisted	proof Classical	proof
Inanimate	 Animate
Inflexible	 Flexible
Mind	Independent Mind	depended
Strings	of	symbols Statements
Produced	by	typographical	rules Theorems	are	proven
Not	subject	to	Spatiotemporal	
causality	
Subject on	spatiotemporal	causality	
Objectivity	 Subjectivity
No	intuition	 Intuition
So	trivial,	beyond	reproach “Feels	right”		not	always	provable	
Astronomical	size Complexity
 
According to what we asserted about this issue, we may accurately acknowledge that 
the inferential result or consequence of a computer assisted proof, satisfies Plato’s conditions 
to intelligibles, since a computer assisted proof’s satisfies the preconditions: 
 
(i.)  ∃xMx (Existence). 
(ii.) Non-spatiotemporal and (therefore) causally inefficacious 
(Abstractedness). 
(iii.) Independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and practices 
(Independence). 
 
Conclusions 
 
For the reasons stated, we may recognize that the conditions for an agent to perform a 
calculus of reason are pretty much achieved. In fact, a programed inanimate, intelligent agent 
with symbolic language is able to demonstrate a proof; a computer assisted proof witch uses 
strings of symbols produced by typographical rules. From a symbolic language, an inanimate, 
inflexible, and mind-independent agent in the end accomplishes a proof that is nor subject to 
spatio-temporal causality. It is an objective, non-intuitive proof that is so trivial, it is beyond 
reproach. This computer assisted proof is, accordingly, a rebellion “against the introduction 
of visible or tangibles objects into the argument”. 
The result of such computer assisted proof is an existent, abstract and independent 
self-representative proof. A mathematical object whose existence is independent of the 
human mind: the objective mathematical entity, Plato very much aspired for.  
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